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Petitioner DENNIS J GARCIA responds to the BRIEF OF
RESPONDENT as follows.
PETITIONER'S REPLY ARGUMENTS
The BRIEF OF RESPONDENT---in which the substantive
"argument" thereof is but a mere five pages of text---is, on
all material issues, superficial and inadequate in its
response to the issues raised in the case. The State's
arguments fail to meaningfully analyze the issues; the State
asserts conclusions which totally "miss" the more meaningful
significance of cases. The Respondent fails to even mention,
let alone address, the "stare decisis" issue arising from
4

the Schultz decision by a former panel of the Utah Court of
Appeals.
I
THE STATE'S "IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES"
IS FALSE AND INTENTIONALLY MISLEADING
On the page "i" of the BRIEF OF RESPONDENT---submitted
above the signatures of THE Attorney General of the State of
Utah, of the Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitor
General (and signed by the Assistant Solicitor, Mr Burnett),
the State makes the following statement under its "List of
All Parties":
To the best of Respondent State of Utah's
knowledge, all interested parties appear in the
caption of this Brief.
Emphasis added. The second (and concluding) sentence of the
Paragraph---although technically accurate in its substance--is confusing and intentionally misleading. That sentence
states:
The Utah Board of Pardons and Parole and the
Utah Office of Debt Collection are entities of the
State of Utah.
The first sentence (i.e. "To the best of Respondent
State of Utah knowledge . . .") is all encompassing: it
affirmatively identifies the entire State government, and
not merely the individual knowledge of the three attorneys
who have submitted the BRIEF in behalf of the State.
Likewise, the term "all interested parties" is used,
albeit

for

an

apparently

misleading
5

and

disingenuous

purpose.
The statements---individually and in combination with
each other---intentionally mislead and ignore the voluntary
"intervention" effected in January 2014 when the Board of
Pardons and the Utah Office of Debt Collection, through
separate Assistant Attorneys General (Ms Reber and Ms Jex)
moved

the

District

Court

to

allow

their

voluntary

"intervention", as the claimed "real-parties-in-interest"
for the case at that time. Their motions for intervention
were granted by the District Court. Thereafter, the two
entities and their counsel filed hundreds and hundreds of
pages of materials in their opposition to GARCIA's set aside
motion. See RECORD at 155-275.
At no time thereafter has either State agency moved to
"withdraw" from the case. That the

case was initially

"appealed" by GARCIA from the District Court and later
petitioned for certiorari review by GARCIA required no
action on the part of the State agencies (the Board of
Pardons and the Office of Debt Collection) to stay in.
Accordingly, the State's assertion that only the State of
Utah is in the case is misleading, even fraudulent upon the
Court.
While the State's motives in suppressing the agencies'
continuing involvement in the case has not been explained
(nor has any formalized

withdrawal from the case been
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identified by the State's appellate counsel), perhaps a
reason the State presently desires to "hide" its agencies'
former

"intervention"

into

the

case

is

that

such

intervention contradicts the State's position: that the
District Court had "no jurisdiction" following sentencing.
Thus,

there

was

no

case

into

which

to

"intervene".

Application of the principle of "judicial estoppel" would
preclude

the State from now denying (or ignoring) the

previous "intervention" of its agencies and the judicial
"judgment" they obtained from the participation. [There may
be other reasons for the State's motivation to "hide" the
previous

intervention

(and

the

effect

thereof)

of

its

subordinate agencies into the "case".]
If the two State agencies are---as the attorneys now
represent---no longer "interested" (State's term) in the
case, then the Court should consider the State's "defenses"
to

the

GARCIA

"set

aside"

motion

to

be

moot

(and/or

abandoned) and enter summary relief in GARCIA's favor.
The asserted "no interest" statement is disingenuous,
given the fact that as recently as this last spring (i.e. in
2017) collection agencies representing the Office of Debt
Collection

have

sent

GARCIA

"demand

letters"

payment of the District Court's judgment.
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demanding

II
THE STATE IGNORES THE PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE
THE STATE ITSELF CHARACTERIZES AS "CONTROLLING"
On

page

identifies

2

of

the

Subsection

"determinative

RESPONDENT'S
77-27-6(4),

statute",

for

BRIEF

Utah

which

the

the

Code,

State
as

a

"controlling

provisions" are identified. The State then and there quotes
the statutory text, including the first sentence thereof
which expressly includes the "within 60 days" requirement.
The "within 60 days" requirement---which is also identified
within Subsection 77-27-6(2)---is (and has always been) the
"core" basis for GARCIA's "set aside" motion. The Court
should follow the statutory provisions which the State
itself characterizes as "determinative" and "controlling".
III
THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS CONCERNING SECTION 77-27-5(3)
ARE FLAWED, INCORRECT AND MISLEADING
On page 2 of RESPONDENT'S BRIEF the State identifies
Subsection 77-27-5(3), Utah Code, to be "determinative" and
"controlling". This conclusion and assertion is flawed,
incorrect and misleading.
This "petition for certiorari" reviews the Utah Court
of Appeals DECISION. In the DECISION the Court of Appeals
did

NOT

base

its

"no

jurisdiction"

ruling

upon

the

provisions of Subsection 77-27-5(3), Utah Code; the Court of
Appeals was basically based upon the singe sentence from
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State vs Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah Court of Appeals 1991).
See ¶ 11 of the DECISION. Subsection 77-27-5(3), Utah Code,
was, within the DECISION, identified but a single time--i.e. ¶ 8 of the DECISION---but only in the context of
GARCIA's claim of "unconstitutionality" of the statute,
which issue has been DENIED "certiorari review" by the
Court.
Notwithstanding

the

relative

clarity

of

the

"no

judicial review of Board decisions" (paraphrased) text of
the statute, the State cites (page 6 within the "argument"
section of its BRIEF) numerous appellate cases---i.e. Foote

vs Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah Supreme Court
1991); Padilla vs Utah Board of Pardons, 947 P.2d 664 (Utah
Supreme Court 1997); and Preece vs House, 886 P.2d 508 (Utah
Supreme Court 1994)---which seemingly run counter to the
clear thrust of the statute [77-27-5(3)]. So obviously,
Subsection 77-27-5(3) does not mean what it appears to say.
The Foote decision affirmatively indicates that if the
statute were to preclude all "judicial review", the statute
would be unconstitutional as violating the "open courts"
provisions

of

Article

I,

Section

11

of

the

Utah

Constitution---an issue GARCIA has sought to raise in this
case. Perhaps now that the State has raised Section 77-275(3) as an issue in the case, the Court should allow the
parties to argue its "unconstitutionality".
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The State's arguments, in various places within its
BRIEF, that GARCIA's sole remedy

against the Board is

pursuant to Rule 65B, is flawed. GARCIA's fundamental claim,
to "set aside" the resultant "civil judgment" arising from
the "late" Board of Pardons "restitution order" is entirely
appropriate, under the Rules---for example, Rule 60, which
is

directly

on

point---as

well

as

case

law

decision,

including State vs Schultz, 2002 UT App 297, 56 P.3d 974
(Utah Court of Appeals 2002). GARCIA's "set aside" argument,
directed to the District Court and its "civil judgment", was
timely filed and appropriate in light of the faciallyobvious "lateness" of the Board's late-filed "restitution
order". See Subsections 77-27-6(2) and 77-27-6(4), Utah
Code.
IV
THE STATE'S CHARACTERIZATION OF PETITIONER'S CLAIMS
IS MISLEADING AND SIMPLY WRONG
On page 4 of its BRIEF the State, in its "summary of
argument" paragraphs, asserts that the "question in this
case" is not whether GARCIA may challenge the Board's
restitution order, but rather "how he may challenge it". The
concept is further identified on page 5 under the "Argument"
section of the State's BRIEF. [This newly-minted observation
and characterization (of opposing party's long-standing
position) certainly contradicts the State's (and/or the
Board's

and

the

Debt

Collection
10

Office's)

consistently

asserted positions: that GARCIA simply could not challenge
the Board's decision. Whether such disability arises from
the "no judicial review" provisions of Subsection 77-275(3)---presently asserted by the State to be "determinative"
and "controlling", although not relied upon by the Court of
Appeals in its DECISION which this Court is presently
reviewing---or some other basis, the State's argument is
disingenuous. Indeed, the State expressly references [page
4, last two sentences of complete paragraph on page] the
statutory prohibition, without actually referring to the
specific statute.] The State agencies identified and argued
the "no jurisdiction/lost jurisdiction" issue (from Montoya)
before the District Court and renewed those claims before
the Utah Court of Appeals, which

incorporated the "no

jurisdiction" basis into its DECISION.
The State's brazen attempt [page 4 of RESPONDENT'S
BRIEF] to infuse the "Rule 60(b) motions" into the Court of
Appeals

"holding"

(State's

terminology)

is

an

improper

extension of the DECISION, which "speaks for itself".
The State's mischaracterization [page 5 of its BRIEF]
as to GARCIA's lack of "challenge" to the Court of Appeals'
"construction
misleading.

of

the

GARCIA

statutory
has

text"

always---and

is

erroneous

and

consistently---

challenged the Court of Appeals DECISION: initially, in his
"petition for rehearing" before the Court of Appeals, and
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later

before

this

Court

in

his

"petition

for

writ

of

certiorari" and in his 30+ pages of "argument" in his
opening BRIEF. Those arguments (i.e. disregard of stare
decisis, disregard of statutory text, the "jurisdiction"
issue and so forth) "speak for themselves".
GARCIA's

position

vis-a-vis

the

DECISION

is

not

susceptible of simple analysis and easy dismissal. The
DECISION

does

undertake

an

apparent

statutory

"construction", but that "construction" is fundamentally
flawed

by

the

Court

of

Appeals'

failure

to

APPLY

the

operative statutory text: namely, the "within 60 days"
restriction contained within Subsection 77-27-6(4), which
the

State

herein

characterizes

as

"determinative"

and

"controlling".
The State's attempt to characterize GARCIA's claims as
an attempt to "review" the Board's decision is incorrect and
misleading. GARCIA's position on this narrow point has
always been to "set aside" the resulting "civil judgment"
which improperly arose from the "late" filing of the Board's
order. In this regard, the State's arguments and analysis
concerning the "extraordinary relief" remedy under Rule 65B
is just so much distraction: while such a litigation could
have

theoretically

been

filed,

it

couldn't

have

been

undertaken within the context of the criminal case, as the
Board of Pardons was not at the time a party thereto. Even
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if

the

Rule

65B

claim

had

been

filed,

the

supposed

"equitable remedy" against the Board to do something (i.e.
hold the statutorily-required hearing it never held) would
still have left the "civil judgment" untouched and in place.
GARCIA's "set aside" motion was timely made, in the proper
court which entered the "civil judgment" at issue in this
case.
V
THE Frito-Lay CASE IS TOTALLY INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE
The State's continued assertion of the 2009 decision of
this

Court

in

the

case

of

Frito-Lay

vs

Utah

Labor

Commission, 2009 UT 71, 222 P.3d 55 (Utah Supreme Court
2009) as being applicable hereto is misleading. This is
nevertheless the situation, even though the Court of Appeals
incorporated the argument into the DECISION.

Frito-Lay holds that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
are not, per se, applicable to procedures followed

in

adjudicatory hearings by administrative agencies. Okay, we
understand that. But that principle has absolutely nothing
to do with the present case. Again, the State attempts to
distract the focus away from the fundamental issue: that the
Board was "late" in filing its order.
The State's blatant attempt to distract the focus is
evidenced by the State's usage of almost two full pages
devoted to the Frito-Lay argument [pp. 7 and 8 of its
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BRIEF], while the State has devoted but two paragraphs---one
on page 9 and one paragraph on page 10---to a discussion of
this Court's decision in the Laycock case. [See discussion
in depth in Point VI, immediately following.] The State
likewise gives extraordinarily superficial treatment---a
mere two paragraphs, consisting of but five sentences---to

Schultz.
VI
THE STATE'S ANALYSIS OF LAYCOCK IS FLAWED AND SUPERFICIAL
The State's brief [one paragraph on Page 9 and one
paragraph on page 10 of its BRIEF] is woefully inadequate to
respond to the analysis raised by Petitioner GARCIA. On Page
10 the State asserts:
. . . Laycock does not discuss a criminal court's
post-sentencing jurisdiction. It [the Laycock
decision] acknowledges only that a party may
appropriately file a petition for an extraordinary
writ to challenge a decision where the party does
not have the right to appeal. Laycock, 2009 UT 53,
¶ 7.
Emphasis added. Bracketed text in the second sentence added
for clarity.
That

the

incredible,

State

if

not

reads

Laycock

troubling.

In

so

The

superficially

State

of

is

Utah,

Petitioner vs Claudia Laycock, District Judge, 2009 UT 53,
214 P.3d 104 (Utah Supreme Court 2009), the Supreme Court
went

to

great

lengths

to

explain

"court-ordered

restitution", even in a post-sentencing situational context.
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Admittedly, Laycock did not, as the State correctly notes
[page 10 of its BRIEF], "discuss a criminal court's postsentencing jurisdiction". Page 10 of State's BRIEF.] But the
reason for that lack of discussion was obvious: everybody
knew that the District Court had jurisdiction.

IF

the

District Court would have no post-sentencing jurisdiction,
it would have been meaningless for the Supreme Court to
order Judge Laycock to order "complete restitution" several
years after the criminal sentence had been announced (in
2004), particularly in the face of the "within one year"
after sentencing requirements of the statute. The Attorney
General's "petition" for "extraordinary relief" against
Judge

Laycock

impliedly

admitted

and

acknowledged

the

"jurisdiction" the District Court had; otherwise, Laycock
could have never been filed in the first place.
So the State's failure to properly analyze Laycock is
deeply troubling. To refer to a principle identified in
Paragraph 7 of a multi-page decision which extended across
page-after-page

as

being

the

"acknowledges

only

that"

(State's terminology, p. 10 of its BRIEF) evidences the
superficiality of the State's analysis of the case---a case
which the State itself filed.
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VII
THE STATE'S FAILURE TO ANALYZE Schultz AND TO RESPOND TO
THE "STARE DECISIS" ARGUMENTS IS LIKEWISE
SUPERFICIAL AND INADEQUATE
Although the "stare decisis" arguments advanced by
GARCIA across almost ten pages of text [see APPELLANT'S
BRIEF, pp. 9-19], the State responded thereto with but two
paragraphs, consisting of a mere 5 sentences. Such a tepid,
superficial

response

to

what

will

proved

to

be

the

dispositive issue is troubling, if not worse. The brief
response is reminiscent of the State's similar response in
February 2016 to the Court of Appeals "supplemental briefing
order", wherein the Court of Appeals sought briefing on the
"effect" (Court of Appeals terminology) of its

State vs

Schultz, 2002 UT App 297, 56 P.3d 974 (Utah Court of Appeals
2002), decision. The original STATE-submitted "supplemental
brief" consisted of approximately four pages, which omitted
any

reference

at all to

Schultz.

Later

that

day,

a

"corrected" supplemental brief was filed, in which a couple
paragraphs---consisting of five or six sentences---addressed

Schultz. Perhaps the State is taking its "cue" from the
Court of Appeals and its DECISION: if we simply ignore

Schultz we won't have to deal with it. So we will (ignore
Schultz) and we'll pretend it doesn't exist.
The State's analysis is superficial and simply wrong.
It

apparent

attempt

[page

16

9,

second

paragraph]

to

distinguish

Schultz

from

the

instant

situation

because

Schultz arose in the context of a "challenge to the validity
of a continuing garnishment based on a restitution order"
[Id.] is meaningless. As previously noted extensively in
GARCIA'S

PETITIONER'S

BRIEF,

Schultz

held---repeated

numerous times---that the Board's restitution order was
invalid, because it was "late" in its making, and that the
Board had no jurisdiction to enter the order.
The State argues that

Schultz did not discuss the

"jurisdiction" of the sentencing court. That's probably the
only truly-accurate statement made by the State in its
BRIEF. But that situation does not change the analysis nor
the result. The sentencing court
jurisdiction.

So

Schultz

is

was

binding

presumed to have
precedent

and

the

principle of stare decisis was violated by the DECISION. Of
course the State made no attempt to respond to the "stare
decisis",

because

it

could

make

no

effective

rebuttal

thereto.
The singular distinction between the instant case and

Schultz is NOT the "continuing garnishment" context. THE
single distinction in the instant case is the Legislature's
adoption---in 2005---the technical amendments to Subsection
77-27-6(4), and also in 77-27-6(2), adopting the "within 60
days" (of termination of sentence) requirement. While the
amendment gave the Board of Pardons an additional sixty days
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in which to act, the Board was nevertheless "late" in making
and filing its "restitution order". So of course the State
wants to "sweep under the rug", as does the DECISION, this
unavoidable but nevertheless rather "inconvenient truth".
CONCLUSION
The State's BRIEF and the superficial and inapplicable
arguments

and

analysis

contained

therein

are

woefully

inadequate, on their face. The Court should easily recognize
the superficiality and dismiss the arguments.
The "bottom line" is unchanged. The Court of Appeals
DECISION fails to follow Schultz, and thus violates the
principle of "stare decisis", which is one of the bedrock
foundations of our system of law.
The DECISION fails to even recognize, let alone apply,
the dispositive nature of the "lateness" of the Board's
making as well as filing its "restitution order". These
failures invalidate---as per Schultz and certainly under the
statute---that

filing

and

the

"civil

judgment"

which

automatically arises therefrom.

Laycock implicitly overrules Montoya and its progeny;
the Supreme Court should now say so.
The Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals must be
overturned and the case remanded back to the Utah Court of
Appeals, with directions to remand the case back to the
District Court with instructions to set aside the resultant
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"civil judgment".
Petitioner should be awarded all his costs incurred
herein (at both appellate courts).
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Oral argument before the Court is requested.
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of June, 2017.
/s/Stephen G Homer
STEPHEN G HOMER
Attorney for Appellant-Petitioner
DENNIS J GARCIA
COUNSEL'S CERTIFICATION ["WORD COUNT" AND PRINT SIZE]
Counsel certifies that substantive portions of this
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF (excluding captions, indexes,
separately-quoted statutes, and so forth) were printed in
Courier type, in a size 13 font.
The "word count" of the substantive portions of the
BRIEF (including captions, certifications and so forth) is
3145 words, per the "word count" subroutine within the wordprocessing program upon which the document was created.
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I certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing
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